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FRANCIS LIEBER: THE ANCIENT AND THE MODERN 
TEACHER OF POLITICS: READING AND STUDY GUIDE, 2000 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
An introductory discourse to a course of lectures on the state.  Delivered October 10, 
1859, in the Law School of Columbia College. 
 
We are met together to discuss the State – that society which in infinite variety, 
from mere specks of social inception to empires of large extent and long tradition, 
covers the whole earth wherever human beings have their habitation – that society 
which more than any other is identified, as cause and as effect, with the rise and fall of 
civilization – that society which, at this very period of mingled progress and relapse, of 
bravery and frivolity, occupies the mind of our whole advancing race, and which is the 
worthiest subject of contemplation for men who do not merely adhere to instinctive 
liberty, but desire to be active and upright partakers of conscious civil freedom. 
In the course of lectures which has been confided to me, we shall inquire into the 
origin and necessity of the state and of its authority – is it a natural or an invented 
institution? Into the ends and uses of government and into the functions of the state – is 
it a blessing or is it a wise contrivance, indeed, yet owing to man’s sinful state, as many 
fathers of the church considered all property to be? Or is it a necessary evil, destined to 
cease when men shall be perfected?  We shall inquire into the grandeur as well as into 
the shame of Political Man.  We shall discuss the history of this the greatest human 
institution, and ultimately take a survey of the literature appertaining to this enduring 
topic of civilized man. 
This day I beg to make some preliminary remarks, chiefly intended to point out to 
you the position which, so far as I can discern, a public teacher of politics in this country 
and at this period either occupies of necessity or ought to occupy. 
Antiquity differs from modern civilization by no characteristic more signally than 
by these two facts, that throughout the former there was but one leading state or 
country at any given period, while now several nations strive in the career of progress 
abreast like the coursers of the Grecian chariot.  The idea of one leading nation, or of a 
“universal monarchy,” has been revived, indeed, at several modern periods, and is even 
now proclaimed by those who know least of liberty; but it is an anachronism, barren in 
everything except mischief, and always gotten up, in recent times, to subserve ambition 
or national conceit.  It has ever proved ruinous, and Austria, France, and Spain have 
furnished us with commentaries. 
The other distinctive fact is the recuperative energy of modern states.  Ancient 
states did not possess it.  Once declining, they declined with increasing rapidity until 
their ruin was complete.  The parabola of a projectile might be called the symbol of 
ancient leading states – a curve, which slowly rises, reaches its maximum, and 
precipitately descends, not to rise again, while the line of modern civilization, power, 
and even freedom, resembles, in several cases, those undulating curves which, having 
risen to one maximum, do not forego the rising to another, though they decline in the 
mean time to a minimum.  Well may we call this curve the symbol of our public hope.  If 
it were not so, must not many a modern man sink into the gloom of a Tacitus? 
Now, closely connected with these, and especially with the second fact, it seems 
to me, is this observation that in almost all the spheres of knowledge, action, or 
production the philosophizing inquirer in antiquity makes his appearance when the 
period of high vitality has passed.  The Greek and Roman grammarians inquired into 
their exquisite languages when the period of vigorous productiveness in them, of literary 
creativeness, was gone or fast going; when poets cased to sing, historians ceased to 
gather, to compare and relate, and orators ceased to speak.  The jurists collected, 
systematized, and tried to codify when a hale and energizing common law was giving 
rapidly way to the simple mandates and decrees of the ruler, or had ceased to be 
among the living and productive things; the aesthetic writer found the canons of the 
beautiful when the sculptor and architect were stimulated more and more by imitation of 
the inspired masterworks created by the genius of by-gone days; and Aristotle founds 
the science of politics (we can hardly consider Pythagoras as the founder) when Athens 
and all Greece were drifting fast towards the breakers where the Roman wreckers were 
to gather the still glorious wrecks; while Cicero writes his work of the Republic when 
that dread time was approaching in which (as a contemporary president of the French 
senate has officially expressed it), the Roman democracy ascended the throne in the 
person of the Caesars – rulers of whom we, speaking plain language, simply say that 
Tacitus and Suetonius have described them; people, whether we call them democracy 
or not, broken in spirit and so worthless that they rapidly ceased to know how to work 
for their living, or to fight for their existence; rulers and people whose history bears the 
impressive title, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.  Or was, forsooth, the 
republican period of Rome, merely preparatory for the glorious empire, sold at auction 
by the praetorians? 
It is different in modern times, thank God!  Modern critics, philosophers, and 
teachers, in almost every branch, have lived while their age was productive, and 
frequently they have aided in bringing on fresh and sometimes greater epochs.  In the 
science of politics this fact appears in a strong light.  England has advanced in power, 
freedom, and civilization since Thomas More, Harrington, Milton, Bacon, Sidney, and 
Locke, William Temple, and even the latest of the last century, wrote and taught.  
France, whatever we may think of her present period of imperial transition and 
compressing absolutism, had far advanced beyond that state in which she was from the 
times of Bodinus and Montesquieu down to Rousseau or the Physiocrats, and will rise 
above the present period in which [François] Guizot and [Alexis] De Tocqueville 
have given their works to her.  Italy, however disappointed her patriots and friends may 
be at this moment, and however low that country, which is loved by our whole race, like 
a favorite sister of the family, had once sunk, stands forth more hopeful than, perhaps, 
she has done at any time since Thomas Aquinas1 and Dante2
                                            
1 De Rebus Publicis et Principum Institutione Libri IV. 
, or Machiavelli, Paolo 
Sarpi, [Giambastiasta] Vico, and all her writers down to Filangieri, that meditated on 
the state.  If there are those who think that I have stated what is not warranted by the 
inadequate settlement of northern Italy – if, indeed, it prove a settlement – and by an 
arbitrary peace which, in its sudden conclusion by two single men, unattended by any 
counselor of their own or representative of any ally, in behalf of near ninety millions of 
people, presents absolutism and foreign rule m ore nakedly than any other fact in 
2 De Monarchiâ. 
modern Europe that I remember, if the affairs of Italy be viewed in this light, I must point 
to the fact that in spite of all this arbitrariness, the question:  Do the people wish for this 
or that government, this or that dynasty? Forces itself into hearing, and is allowed to 
enter as an element in the settlement of national affairs.  It may indicate an imperfect 
state of things that this fact must be pointed out by the publicist as a signal step in 
advance; but it will be readily acknowledged as a characteristic change for the better, if 
we consider that in all those great settlements of the last century and of the present, by 
which the territories of the continental governments were rearranged, reigning houses 
were shifted, and states were made and unmade, Italy was consulted about herself no 
more than the princely hunter consults the hart which his huntsman cuts up for 
distribution among the guests and fellow-hunters.  This century may yet see a united 
Italia, when at length it will cease to be di dolor ostello [the sorrowful inn] of that song of 
woe. 
Germany, with whatever feeling he that loves her may behold that noble country, 
robbed as she is of her rightful heirship and historic adumbration as a nation in full 
political standing among the peoples of the earth, for her own safety and honor, and for 
European peace and civilization, has nevertheless advanced towards unity and freedom 
since the times of Grotius and Spinoza (I call them hers), and Puffendorff, Wolf, 
Schlözer, and [Immanuel] Kant, and will advance beyond what she is in these days of 
Zachariae, Welcker, Mittermaier, and Mohl.  Truth forces the philosopher to state the 
fact such as it is, although as patriot he finds it difficult to acknowledge the pittance of 
national political existence as yet doled out by modern history to that country whose 
present intellectual influence vies with the political she once possessed under the 
Hohenstaufen. 
The teacher of political science in these days, without amusing himself with 
shallow optimism, has then the encouraging consciousness that his lot is not 
necessarily the mere summing up and putting on record of a political life of better and of 
by-gone days never to return, not to be surpassed.  The historian, whom Schlegel calls 
the prophet of the past, may in our days also be the sower of fresh harvests.  The 
teaching of the publicist may become an element of living statesmanship; he may 
analyze essential fundamentals of his own society, of which it may not have been 
conscious, and the knowledge of which may influence future courses; he may awaken, 
he may warn and impress the lesson of inevitable historic sequences, and he may give 
the impulse to essential reforms; he may help to sober and recall intoxicated racers 
hurrying down on dangerous slopes, and he may assist the manly jurist and advocate in 
planting on the outlying downs of civil life those hardy blades which worry back each 
aggressive wave when walls of stone prove powerless against the stormy floods of 
invading power; he may contribute his share to the nautical almanac and the sailing 
directions for the practical helmsman; he may pronounce truths which legislators quote 
as guiding rules in the parliament of his own country, or statesmen when met in a 
congress of entire nations; his teaching may modify, unconsciously to the actors 
themselves, and even in spite of their own belief, the course of passion, or set bounds 
to the worst of all political evils, public levity, and popular indifference – if he will 
resolutely speak out the truth, and if he occupies a free position.  Others must judge 
whether I am accustomed to do the one; I think I occupy the other. 
Few public teachers of public law may have occupied a freer position than I do 
here before you.  I belong to no party when teaching.  All I acknowledge is Patria Cara, 
Carior Libertas, Veritas Carissima [I love my country, I love liberty more, I love truth the 
most].  No government, no censor, no suspicious partisan watches my words; no party 
tradition fetters me; no connections force special pleading on me.  I am surrounded by 
that tone of liberality, with that absence of petty inquisition, which belongs to populous 
and active cities, where the varied interests of life, religion, and knowledge meet and 
modify one another.  Those who have called me to this chair know what I have taught in 
my works, and that on no occasion have I bent to adjust my words to gain the 
approbation of prince or people.  The trustees of this institution have called me hither 
with entire trust.  Neither before nor after my appointment have they intimated to me, 
however indirectly, collectively or individually, by hint or question, or by showing me 
their own convictions, how they might wish me to tinge one or the other of the many 
delicate discussions belonging to my branches.  I can gain no advantage by my 
teaching; neither title, order, or advancement on the one hand, nor party reward or 
political lucre on the other – not even popularity.  Philosophy is not one of the high 
roads to the popular mind.  All that the most gifted in my precise position could possibly 
attain to is the reputation of a just, wise, fearless, profound, erudite, and fervent teacher.  
This, indeed, includes the highest reward which he who addresses you will endeavor to 
approach as near as lies within him. 
But if the modern teacher of political science enjoys advantages over the teacher 
in ancient times, there are also difficulties which beset the modern teacher – some 
peculiar to our own period, and some to our own country at this time. 
Political science meets to this day with the stolid objection:  What is it good for?  
Are statesmen made by books, or have the best books been made by the best 
statesmen?  The name given to an entire party under Louis Philippe – the doctrinaires 
– seems to be significant in this point of view.  You are, so we are told even by me of 
cultivated minds, not farther advanced than Aristotle was; and what must we think of the 
tree if we judge by its fruits, the fantastic conceptions of the so-called best state, with 
which the history of your science abounds?  And [David] Hume, the philosopher, said:  
“I am apt to entertain a suspicion that this world is still too young to fix any general 
truths in politics which will remain true to the latest posterity.”  But if the world is old 
enough to commit political sins and crimes of every variety, it cannot be too young to 
sink the shafts for the ore of knowledge, though the nuggets of pure truth may be rare.  
Does the miner of any other science hope for more? 
Some friends have expressed their surprise that in my inaugural address I should 
have considered it necessary to dwell on the dignity and practical utility of political 
science as a branch of public instruction.  I confess their surprise astonished me in turn.  
Not more than twenty years ago, Dahlmann said that “the majority of men believe to this 
day that everything must be learned, only not politics, every case of which may be 
decided by the light of nature,” meaning what is generally understood by common 
sense.  Have things changed since these words were spoken?  As late as in the year 
1852, De Tocqueville, when presiding over the Academy of Morals and Politics, 
occupied himself in his annual address chiefly with the consideration of the prejudices 
still prevailing, not only among the people at large, but among statesmen and politicians 
themselves, against the science and studies cultivated by that division of the Institute of 
France;3
I have quoted this passage, which appears to me feeble and unphilosophical, for 
the purpose of showing that it is by no means useless to dwell, even in our age and in 
the midst of a civilized people, on the moral and practical importance, and not only on 
the scientific interest of the study of history and politics; and must dismiss, at least in 
this brief introductory lecture, a thorough discussion of these remarks – inconsistent, 
since their author admits one teaching of history and experience; suicidal to the 
philosopher, since they would extinguish the connection between the different “periods”; 
and what becomes of the connection of the events and facts within each period? What 
divides, philosophically speaking, the periods he refers to so absolutely from one 
another? What becomes of continuity, without which it is irrational to speak of the 
philosophy of history? – unhistorical, for every earnest student knows how almost 
inconceivably great the influence of some political philosophers, and of the lessons of 
great historians, has been on the development of our race; unreal, since [G. W. F.] 
Hegel makes an intrinsic distinction between the motive powers of nations and states 
on the one hand, and of minor communities and individuals on the other; destructive, 
because what he says of political rules might be said of any rule of action, of laws, of 
constitutions; and unpsychological, because he ignores the connection between 
principle and practice, the preventive and modifying effect of the acknowledged principle 
or rule, whether established by experience, science, or authority, and its influence, in 
many cases, in spite of the actor, not unlike Julian the Apostate, whom Christianity did 
not wholly cease to influence, though he warred against it. 
 and Hegel, esteemed by many the most profound and comprehensive thinker 
of modern times, says, in his Philosophy of History, when speaking of that method of 
treating history which is called on the continent of Europe the pragmatic method, that 
“rulers, statesmen, and nations are wont to be emphatically commended to the teaching 
which experience offers in history.  But what experience and history teach is this, that 
peoples and governments never have learned anything from history or acted on 
principles deduced from it.  Each period is involved in such peculiar circumstances, 
exhibits a condition of things so strictly idiosyncratic, that its conduct must be regulated 
by considerations connected with itself, and itself alone.  Amid the pressure of great 
events a general principle gives no hope.  It is useless to revert to similar circumstances 
in the past.  The pallid shades of memory struggle in vain with the life and freedom of 
the present.” 
Was ever usurpation stopped in its career of passion by a moral or political 
apothegm?  Possibly it was.  The flashes of solemn truths sometimes cross the clouds 
of gathering crime and show how dark it is; but whether or not, is not now the question.  
Was ever burglar, crowbar in hand, stopped in his crime by reciting the eighth 
commandment?  Probably not, although we actually know that murder, already 
unsheathed, has been sheathed again; but what is more important for the connected 
progress of our race is, that millions have been prevented from fairly entering on the 
path of filching or robbery by receiving at home and in the school the tradition of that 
rule, “Thou shalt not steal,” and of the whole Decalogue, as one of the ethical elements 
of their society, which acts, although unrecited, and even unthought of in a thousand 
                                            
3 Even the minor lucubrations [scholarship: lit., working by candlelight] of this excellent writer have 
acquired an additional interest since death has put an end to his work.  I would refer, therefore, to the 
National Intelligencer, Washington, 6th May, 1852, where the entire address alluded to is given. 
cases, as the multiplication table or Euclid’s elements act, unrecited and unremembered 
at the time, in the calculations of the astronomer or of the carpenter, and in the quick 
disposition which military genius makes in the midst of confused battles, or a sea 
captain beating in dirty weather through a strait of coral reefs. 
We Americans would be peculiarly ungrateful to political science and history 
were we to deny their influence.  Every one who has carefully studied our early history, 
and more especially our formative period, when the present constitution struggled into 
existence, knows how signally appear the effects of the political literature on which, in a 
great measure, the intellects of our patriots had been reared, and how often the 
measures which have given distinctness and feature to our system were avowedly 
supported for adoption, by rules and examples drawn from the stores of history or 
political philosophy, either for commendation or warning.  They had all fed on Algernon 
Sidney or [Baron de] Montesquieu; they had all read or scanned the history of the 
United States of the Netherlands, whence they borrowed even our name.  It is the very 
opposite to what Hegel maintains, and the finding of these threads is one of the greatest 
delights of the philosophic mind. 
Even if the science of politics were only, as so many mistake it to be, a collection 
of prescriptions for the art of ruling, and not quite as much of the art and science of 
obeying (why and when, whom and what, and how far we ought to obey) – but it is more 
than either – even then the science would be as necessary as the medical book is to the 
physician, or as the treatise on fencing, and the fencing-master himself, are to him who 
wishes to become expert in the art.  No rule merely learned by heart will help in complex 
cases of highest urgency, but the best decision is made by strong sense and genius 
that have been trained.  It is thus in grammar and composition.  It is thus in all spheres.  
Every practitioner requires much which cannot be learned from books, and even this will 
be of no use unless cultivated by instruction or unless brought into play as opportunity 
offers.  Then natural gift, theory, and interpretation by experience melt into one 
homogeneous mass of choice Corinthian brass, in which the component elements can 
no longer be distinguished. 
Although I shall not attempt to teach, in this course, actual statesmanship, or 
what has been styled the art of ruling, yet that which perhaps the older English writers 
more especially meant by the word prudence, that is foresight (prudential futurorum), 
must necessarily enter as a prominent element in all political discussions; nor do I 
desire to pass on without guarding myself against the misconception that I consider the 
science, the knowing, as the highest aim of man.  As mere erudition stands to real 
knowledge, so does knowing stand to doing and being.  Action and character stand 
above science.  Piety stands above theology; justice above jurisprudence; health and 
healing above medicine; poesy above poetics; freedom and good government above 
politics. 
One of the most serious obstacles in the way of a ready reception of political 
science with that interest and favor which it deserves for the benefit of the whole 
community, is the confounding of the innumerable theories of the “Best State,” and of all 
the Utopias, from Plato’s Republic to modern communism, with political science.  There 
is a suspicion lurking in the minds of many persons that the periods of political 
fanaticism through which our race has passed, have been the natural fruits of political 
speculation.  But has the absence of political speculation led to no mischief, and not to 
greater ones?  Let Asia answer.  Our race is eminently a speculative race, and we had 
better speculate about nature, language, truth, the state, mind and man, calmly and 
earnestly, that is, scientifically, than superstitiously and fanatically.  One or the other our 
race will do.  Brave jurists, noble historians, and free publicists have, to say the least, 
accompanied the rising political movement of our race, with their meditations and 
speculations.  The most sinister despots of modern times have been, and are to this 
day, the most avowed enemies of political science.  Inquiry incommodes them; and 
although absolutism has had its been and eloquent political philosophers, it is 
nevertheless true that the words embroidered on the fillet which graces the brow of our 
must have ever been – In Tyrannos. 
On the other hand, is there any period of intense action free from those 
caricatures by which the Evil One always mocks that which is most sacred?  Is 
theology, is medicine, are the fine arts, was the early period of Christianity, was the 
Reformation, was ever a revolution, however righteous, was the revival of any great 
cause, the discovery of any great truth, free from its accompanying caricature?  The 
differential calculus is a widely spread blessing to knowledge and our progress, yet it 
had its caricature in the belief of one of the greatest minds that it might be found a 
means to prove the immortality of the soul.  The humanitarian, the theological and the 
political philosopher, know that the revival of letters and the love of Grecian literature 
mark a period most productive in our civilization, while the rise of modern national 
languages and literatures ushered in the new era, and has remained a permanent 
element of our whole advancement; yet Erasmus, the foremost scholar of his time, 
contemned the living speech of Europe, and allowed the dignity of language to none but 
the two idioms of antiquity.  Our own age furnishes us with two notable instances of this 
historic caricature, appearing in the hall of history not unlike the grimacing monkey 
which the humorous architect of the Middle Ages sometimes placed in the foliage of his 
lofty architecture, near the high altar of the solemn cathedral.  The history of labor, 
mechanical and predial [agricultural], its gradual rise in dignity from the Roman slavery 
to its present union with science, is one of the golden threads in the texture we call the 
history of our race; yet we have witnessed, in our own times, the absurd effort of raising 
physical labor into an aristocracy as absolute, and more forbidding, than the aristocracy 
of the Golden Book of Venice, an absurdity which is certain to make its appearance 
again in some countries.  Should we on that account refuse to read clearly, and with 
delight, the rise of labor in the book of History?  Should we deplore the gradual 
elevation of the woman peculiar to our race, and all that has been written to produce it, 
because in our age it has been distorted by folly, and even infamy, or by that caricature 
of courtesy which allows the blackest crime to go unpunished because the malefactor 
happens to be a female, thus depriving woman of the high attribute of responsibility, 
and, therefore, degrading her? 
We honor science; we go further, we acknowledge that no nation can be great 
which does not honor intellectual greatness.  Mediocrity is a bane, and a people that 
has no admiration but for victories gained on the battle-field, or for gains acquired in the 
market, must be content to abdicate its position among the leading nations.  But no 
nation can be great that admires intellectual greatness alone, and does not hold 
rectitude, wisdom, and sterling character in public esteem.  The list of brilliant despots, 
in government or science, always followed, as they are, by periods of collapse and ruin, 
is long indeed. 
The faithful teacher of politics ought to be a manly and profound observer and 
construer.  [1]  His business does not lie with fantastic theories or empty velleities 
[wishful thinking], except to note them historically, and thus to make them instructive.  
[2]  Aristotle says, and Bacon quotes his saying approvingly, that the nature of a thing is 
best known by the study of its details, and [Thomas] Campanella, whom I quote only to 
remind you how early the truth was acknowledged, observes that a thing consists in its 
history (its development), not in its momentary appearance, its phenomenon.  Let us 
keep these two dicta before our eyes during our inquiries into the state, with this 
addition, that the knowledge of details yields fruitful acquisition only if it be gathered up 
in an ultimate knowledge of the pervading organism; and that, however true the position 
of Campanella, we must remember that politics is a moral science, and history, the 
record of political society, has not necessarily a prescribing character.  Where this is 
forgotten men fall into the error of Symmachus [4C Roman prefect] pleading for Victoria, 
because the goddess of the forefathers, against the God of the Christians, because a 
new God; but where men forget the importance of history, development becomes 
impossible, and dwarfish schemes will set men in restless motion, like the insects of 
corruption busy in disintegrating mischief.   
I neither belong to the school of those who, acknowledging free agency in the 
individual, teach, nevertheless, that nations follow a predestined fate, wholly 
independent of the beings composing them [Historical School]; nor do I belong to the 
modern optimists who complacently see nothing but advancement in our dubious age 
[Progressive School].  I neither believe the region of the state to resemble the Olympus 
with its suspended ethics; nor do I belong to the retrospective school.  I differ with those 
who follow Sismondi, a justly honored name, in the opinion that “every day must 
convince us more that the ancients understood liberty and the conditions of free 
government infinitely better than we do.”  The political progress of our race has been 
signal.  How else can we explain these patent facts, [1] that modern states with liberty 
have a far longer existence – where is the England of antiquity counting a thousand 
years from her Alfred, and still free? – [2] that liberty and wealth in modern nations 
have advanced together [liberty is not been made independent of wealth], which the 
ancients considered axiomatically impossible; [3] that modern liberty may not only 
advance with advancing civilization and culture, but requires them; [4] that, occasionally 
at least, modern states pass through periods of lawlessness without succumbing, or 
that, as was mentioned before, modern societies have risen again after having passed 
through depressed periods threatening ultimate ruin; [5] that in modern times alone the 
problem has been solved, however rarely, of uniting progressive liberty with progressive 
order, which seemed to Tacitus a problem incapable of solution; [6] that the moderns 
alone have shown the possibility of ruling large nations (not cities) with broadcast 
liberty; [7] that in modern history alone we find civil liberty without enslaving the lower 
layer of society, and with the elimination of the idea of castes; [8] that in modern 
societies alone essential and even radical changes in the political structure are effected 
without razing the whole edifice to the ground; [9] that moderns alone have found the 
secret of limiting supreme public power, in whomsoever vested, by the representative 
principle and institutional liberty; [10] that the moderns have discovered and developed 
the essential element of a lawful and loyal opposition, while the ancients knew only of 
political factions, not exchanging benches, but expelling or extirpating one another; [11] 
that in modern times alone we meet with a fair penal trial, and with that august 
monument of civil liberty, a well-guarded trial for high treason; [12] that the moderns 
have found the means of combining national vigor with the protection of individual 
rights; and [13] that by international law a “system of states,” as Europe has been 
called, can exist whose members are entire sovereign nations?  Much of all this is 
owing to the spread and development of Christianity, and we moderns are very far from 
doing all we ought to do, but this does not prove Sismondi’s opinions to be confirmed. 
There are difficulties surrounding the teacher of politics, either exclusively 
belonging to our country, or at least presenting themselves here at present more 
decidedly.  I ought not wholly to pass them over, for they show to what degree of 
indulgence a teacher is entitled; but I shall select a few only, and treat of them as briefly 
as may be. 
I believe that the family of nations to which we belong has arrived at a period in 
its political development in which the only choice lies between institutional and firmly-
established liberty, whether this be monarchical or republican as to the apex of the 
government on the one hand; and on the other hand, intermittent revolution and 
despotism, or shifting anarchy and compression, which, like the surgeon’s tourniquet, 
may stanch the blood for a moment, but has no healing power, nor can it be left 
permanently on the lacerated artery without causing mortification and death.  Expanding 
institutional liberty alone is now conservative.  There has been a conflict between 
freedom and despotism during the whole history of our race; but never before, it seems 
to me, have liberty, with all its fervor, and absolutism, with all its imposing power or 
sepulchral sculpture, stood directly opposite to one another so boldly, and perhaps so 
grandly, as at present.  The advance of knowledge and intelligence gives to despotism 
a brilliancy, and the necessity of peace for exchange and industry give it a facility to 
establish itself which it never possessed before.  Although the political inquirer and 
reflecting historian know, as well as the naturalist, that life consists in the unceasing and 
reproductive pulsation, in the ever active principle of vitality, not in the few brilliant 
phenomena or in striking eruptions, yet radiant success always attracts admiration for 
the time being.  Absolutism in our age is daringly draping itself in the mantle of 
liberty, both in Europe and here.  What we suffer in this respect is in many cases the 
after-pain of Rousseauism, which itself was nothing but democratic absolutism.  
There is, in our times, a hankering after absolutism; and a widespread, almost fanatical 
idolatry of success, a worship of will, whose prostrate devotees forget that will is an 
intensifier and multiplier of our dispositions, whatever they are applied to, most glorious 
or most abhorrent, as the case may be, and that will, without the shackles of conscience 
or the reins of a pure purpose, is almost sure of what contemporaries call success.  It is 
so easy to succeed without principle!  It seems to me that those grave words in the 
solemn conclusion of De Tocqueville’s Old Régime have a far wider application at this 
time than the author gave to them.  He says there that his countrymen are “more prone 
to worship chance, force, success, éclat, noise, than real glory; endowed with more 
heroism than virtue, more genius than common sense; better adapted for the 
conception of grand designs than the accomplishment of great enterprises.”4
                                            
4 I cannot dismiss this quotation without advising my younger friends to read, in connection with my 
remarks, the whole passage beginning with the words, “When I examine that nation.”  May they do it not 
  [Lieber 
elsewhere contrasts the “Anglican liberty” of the English tradition of limited monarchy 
with the “Gallican liberty” associated with the French tradition of absolute ,monarchy]. 
While thus political elements are jostling and preparing us for a greater struggle, 
it appears that in our times men are more bent than formerly on taking refuge in mere 
political formulas, such as universal suffrage and a despot, or universal suffrage and an 
absolute party.  But wherever the people, fatigued by contest or disorder, go to sleep on 
a mere political formula, there political life and health and – may I call it so? – civil 
productiveness rapidly decline and approach extinction [he is describing political 
apathy], at the same time that those who still choose to act are arrayed against each 
other in all the bitterness which dogmatic formulas are apt to engender or to express 
[partisan bickering, of course]. 
To attract attention in the midst of these gusts of passion may not be an easy 
task [for the teacher of politics].  In addition I ought to mention, with reference to our 
own country, three points – flattery, disrepute of politics, and a certain theory which 
has formed itself regarding the propriety of discussion [i.e., issues drawn into the 
political arena lose their own objective character and become so distorted that the 
cannot be discussed except in terms of partisan caricatures]. 
[1]  The people of this country have been flattered so long by optimist speakers, 
lecturers, and authors, and the vice of exaggeration has become so common, that 
philosophic candor is felt by many as a lack of patriotic sympathy.  The sovereign, the 
prince, as old writers used to call the powerholder, be he monarch or the people, likes 
courtiers, flatterers, and adulators, and he finds them.  Truth becomes irksome, and 
while it is deemed heroic boldly to speak to a monarch, he who censures the sovereign 
in a republic is looked upon as no friend to the country. 
[2]  Public affairs again have been frequently handled in such a manner and with 
such impunity that the word politician has acquired a meaning which reminds us of the 
Athenian times, when philosophers thought it necessary to advise the seekers after 
truth to abstain from the agora.  In former times the term diplomatist was coupled with 
undesirable associations; the word politician has now, in the minds of many, no enviable 
meaning.  I do not conceal from myself that to me falls the duty of teaching the science 
of public affairs at a period of depressed public mind. 
[3]  And lastly, it is a characteristic of our present public life that almost every 
conceivable question is drawn within the spheres of politics; when there, it is 
incontinently seized upon by political parties, and once within the grasp of parties, it is 
declared improper to be treated anywhere except in the arena of political strife.  If it be 
treated elsewhere, in whatever spirit, it is taken for granted that the inquiry has been 
instituted for groveling party purposes.  Fair and frank discussion has thus become 
emasculated, and the people submit to dictation.  There is a wide class of topics of high 
importance which cannot be taken in hand even by the most upright thinker without its 
being suspected that he is in the service of one party or section of the country and 
                                                                                                                                            
only remembering that much that is said in it does not apply to the French alone, but also that De 
Tocqueville could say what he did say without being considered by the French unpatriotic.  An American 
citizen could not have made similar remarks of the Americans without raising a storm of general 
indignation.  No American student of political philosophy or history should be without that little volume, 
The Old Régime and the Revolution, by Alexis de Tocqueville, translated by John Bonner, New York, 
1856. 
hostile to the other. 
All this makes it – I do not say difficult to steer between the dangers; an attempt 
at doing this would be dishonest – but necessary to ask for a fair and patient hearing.  
No teacher can at any time dispense with that “favorable construction,” for which the 
commons of England petition the ruler at the beginning of each parliament.  An honest 
desire to hear truly what the speaker means is indispensable wherever human speech 
bridges over the cleft which separates individual from individual, but it becomes the 
more necessary the more important the sphere of discussion is, and is granted the more 
scantily the more exciting the topic may be. 
Montesquieu, in the preface of the Spirit of Laws, asks as a favor that a work of 
twenty years’ labor may not be judged of by the reading of a moment, but that he may 
be judged by the whole.  I too, placed in some respects more delicately than 
Montesquieu was, ask you to judge of the lectures which I am going to deliver by the 
whole and by the pervading spirit.  My work is not, like Montesquieu’s, a work of twenty 
years; it is more.  Brief as this course will be, all I teach is the result of a long and 
checkered, an observing, and, I hope, a thoughtful, life.  Montesquieu, when he asks for 
the favor, adds:  “I fear it will not be granted.”  I do not make this addition to my request.  
I simply speak to you as to friends willing to hear what a man holds to be true and right 
in the region of political knowledge and action, the highest phase of which is civil 
freedom – a man who in his boyhood saw the flows and ebbs of the Napoleonic era and 
heard the European cry of oppression, and has from that great time to this longed or 
labored for liberty in speech and book, and in the teacher’s chair, in prison and in 
freedom, well or wounded, in his native land and in his wedded country, and who feels 
that, as the one main idea through the whole life of him whom lately we have followed in 
our minds to his most honored grave [reference to the great geographer, Alexander 
von Humboldt], was the life of nature with all her energies, so has been the leading 
idea and affection of him who speaks to you, from his early days to this hour, in spite of 
all the reverses and errors of our race, political justice, the life of civil freedom – liberty, 
not as a pleasing or even noble object to be pursued by classes freed from the 
oppressive demands of material existence, but as an element of essential civilization, as 
an earnest demand of self-respecting humanity, as an actuality and a principle of social 
life – as an evidence that we are created, not in the image of those beings that are 
below us, but of him that is high above us. 
 
-- Francis Lieber, Miscellaneous Writings. Vol. 1 (1881) 
 
 FRANCIS LIEBER: THE TEACHER OF POLITICS 
 
Key Ideas 
 
Ancient city-states and empires rose and fell in succession; philosophers appeared as they waned 
Modern nation-states are resilient, progressive, and competitive in a balance of power arrangement 
Modern philosophers and teachers emerged during productive times 
The study of history, morals, and politics reveals the importance of character and action over science 
Historical relativism is inconsistent and suicidal; Lieber alludes to an underlying natural law  
The Decalogue is one of the underlying ethical elements that has a tacit influence on behavior 
Politics is a moral science that requires courageous and profound observation and interpretation 
Signs of progress in modern civilization include advancing liberty, wealth, representation, resilience 
Modern despotism -- scientific, revolutionary, utopian -- disguises itself as liberty and democracy 
The gusts of passion that beset public life are flattery of the people, political cynicism, partisanship 
Lieber opposes these gusts with a passion for civil freedom (institutional liberty) 
 
Outline 
 
A. PURPOSE OF THE LECTURE SERIES  (369) 
1.       Pedagogical Purpose: Contemplate the State 
a. Instill a desire to be active and upright partakers of conscious civil freedom (as 
opposed to instinctive liberty) 
2.       Inquire into the Origin and Necessity of the State and Its Authority. 
3.       Inquire into the Grandeur and Shame of Political Man 
B. MODERNITY DISTINGUISHED FROM ANTIQUITY  (370) 
1.      One Leading Nation vs. Several Abreast {Theme: The One and the Many] 
2.      Recuperative Energy of Modern States [cf. Wildavsky on Anticipation vs. Resilience] 
C. EMERGENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRERS  (370-74) 
1. Appearance of Ancient Philosopher as Period of High Vitality Waned [Hegel: The Owl of 
Minerva Takes Flight at Dusk] 
2. Modern Philosophers and Teachers Emerged During Productive Times 
a. Scientific and technological progress ["recuperative energies"] [cf. David Landes] 
3. Lieber Expresses His Hopes for a Unified Italy and Germany 
a. Dante: Italia mia di dolor ostello [Italy is called an "inn of grief" because divided 
and weak; Machiavelli later sought a powerful prince who could unify and defend 
it] 
b. Historian is the "prophet of the past" (Schlegel): Teaching function of the publicist 
D. OBJECTIONS OF CRITICS AND LIEBER’S ANSWERS  (374-79) 
 1. Lieber Extols His Freedom as a Public Teacher from Partisan Pressures 
a.    "I love my country, I love liberty more, I love truth the most" 
2. Tocqueville Noted That Prejudices Against the Scientific Study of Morals and Politics 
Prevailed Even among Politicians and Statesmen 
3. Hegel's Historical Relativism (Historicism) Answered 
a. Such historicism is inconsistent, suicidal to the philosopher, unhistorical, unreal, 
destructive, and unpsychological 
b. The moral and practical importance, not just the scientific interest, of the study of 
history and politics is shown by the influence of the Decalogue -- one of the 
ethical elements that society draws upon though not recited or thought of in a 
thousand cases 
4. Influence of Historical Example 
a. Early American patriots fed on the works of men like Algernon Sidney, Baron 
Montesquieu, and the history of the Dutch Republic 
5. Action and Character Stand above Science, as Doing and Being Stand above Knowing 
E. OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPMENT OF A POLITICAL SCIENCE  (379-80) 
1. Confounding of Theories of the Best State (Utopianism) with Political Science [cf. 
Minogue, ch. 12: Project of Despotism] 
a. Suspicion that speculation encourages fanaticism (utopianism) 
b. Absence of such speculation, which is characteristic of Asia, has led to even 
greater mischief 
2. The Problem Is Not Speculation But Its Caricature [cf. Laputa in Gulliver's Travels] 
a. No great blessing to humanity, like Christianity or differential calculus (Leibniz), 
has been free of its accompanying caricature. 
b. Examples: Erasmus's preference for the languages of antiquity; Marx's elevation 
of physical labor into an aristocracy; deference to female criminals 
3. Conclusion: Intellectual Greatness Should Be Honored But Not Above Rectitude, 
Wisdom, and Sterling Character 
F. PROPER CALLING OF A “FAITHFUL TEACHER OF POLITICS”  (381) 
1. Courageous and Profound Observation and Interpretation [Construction] 
a. The facts (details) and history (development) of the state, not just in its 
momentary appearances (phenomena) 
2. Proviso: Politics Is a Moral Science 
a. History is not necessarily prescriptive (error of Symmachus): "But where men 
forget the importance of history, development becomes impossible, and dwarfish 
schemes will set men in restless motion, like the insects of corruption busy in 
disintegrating mischief."  [reference to Edmund Burke's "insects of the hour"] 
3. Schools of Thought: Philosophical (Resembling Olympus with Its Suspended Ethics) and 
Historical (Taking a Retrospective View) 
G. SIGNS OF POLITICAL PROGRESS IN MODERN CIVILIZATION  (382-83) 
1. Modern States with Liberty Have a Longer Life; 
2. Progress in Liberty and Wealth 
3. Liberty Advancing and Requiring the Advancement of Civilization and Culture 
4. Resilience Despite Ruinous Difficulties 
a.       Periods of lawlessness and depression 
5. Progressive Liberty United with Progressive Order 
6. Possibility of Ruling Large Nations with Broadcast (Widespread) Liberty [cf. Federalist, 
No. 10; also Montesquieu] 
7. Civil Liberty without Enslaving the Lower Classes 
8. Change without Wholesale Destruction 
9. Limiting Supreme Public Power through Representation and Institutional Liberty 
[Individuals May Exercise Leverage; No Appeal in a Despotism] 
       10. Lawful and Loyal Opposition 
       11. Fair Penal Trials 
       12. Combination of National Vigor with Protection of Individual Rights 
       13. Existence of an International System of Sovereign States 
H. GUISE OF DESPOTISM IN OUR AGE  (383-84) 
1.       Choice: Institutional Liberty (Monarchical or Republican) vs. Intermittent Revolution and 
Despotism. 
a. Opposition of liberty with its fervor and absolutism with its imposing power or 
sepulchral sculpture has never been more stark 
b. "The advance of knowledge and intelligence gives to despotism a brilliancy, and 
the necessity of peace for exchange and industry give it a facility to establish 
itself which it never possessed before."  [Lieber is referring to France under 
Napoleon III, which was soon to suffer defeat in a war that aided the unification of 
Germany] 
2.       "Absolutism in Our Age Is Daringly Draping Itself in the Mantle of Liberty, 
Both in Europe and Here" 
3. Rousseauism or democratic absolutism (What Irving Babbitt Called the "Idyllic 
Imagination") 
a. Utopian dream that produces "a hankering after absolutism, and a widespread, 
almost fanatical worship of success, a worship of will . . . without the shackles of 
conscience." 
b. Tocqueville noted that his countrymen are "better adjusted for the conception of 
grand designs than the accomplishment of great enterprises."  [cf. Lieber’s 
"Anglican and Gallican Liberty"] 
c. People take refuge in mere political formulas and array themselves against each 
other while civil productiveness declines. 
I. NEED TO WITHSTAND THE “GUSTS OF PASSION”  (385-87) 
1. Three Sources of These Gusts: Characteristics of Present Public Life 
a. Flattery of the People: Arrogance of the Sovereign in a Republic [cf. Ibsen's 
Enemy of the People] [cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1292a7-31] 
b. Disrepute of Politics: Depressed Public Mind 
c. Politicization of Every Issue: Groveling Partisanship, Emasculation of Fair 
and Frank Discussion  
2. Response: We Must Insist on a Fair and Patient Hearing 
3. Lieber’s Passion [Idea of Civil Society] 
a. The life of civil freedom -- of liberty as an element of essential civilization, as a 
fact and principle of social life 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. Identify two characteristics that distinguish modernity from antiquity.  (370) 
 
2. At what historical stage did "philosophical inquirers" like Aristotle and Cicero appear in antiquity?  
What is the significance of the appearance in modern times of men like Bacon, Milton, and 
Locke?  (370-74) 
 
3. What are the objections of critics of political science and how does Lieber answer them?  What is 
higher than science?  (374-79) 
 
4. Identify some of the obstacles that prevent political science from getting fair consideration.  Is 
speculation to blame for political fanaticism?  (379-80) 
 
5. Discuss the proper calling of a "faithful teacher of politics."  What schools of thought are to be 
avoided?  (381) 
 
6. Identify a dozen signs of political progress in modern civilization.  What attribute do they have in 
common?  (382-83) 
 
7. In what form or guise does despotism appear "in our age?"  What does Lieber mean by 
"democratic absolutism?"  (383-84) 
 
8. Identify some sources of the "gusts of passion" that sow seeds of political bitterness.  What 
should we do when faced with opposition and misunderstanding?  (385-87) 
 
9. What is Lieber's main idea in life?  [For Alexander von Humboldt it was "the life of nature with all 
her energies"]  (386-87) 
 
Lieber Review 
 
differences between ancient and modern polities   Hegel’s historical relativism 
schools of thought    signs of political progress in modern civilization 
institutional liberty    Rousseauism or democratic absolutism   
three gusts of passion 
